Heightened tariff risk, partially offset by increased domestic stimulus
Despite achieving its official annual growth target of "around 5%" in 2024, China's economic performance was characterised by significant imbalances and volatility. On the positive side, exports transitioned from a drag to a key driver of growth, fueled by recovering global demand for electronics and resilient US consumption. Additionally, manufacturing investment continued to be robust, supported by ongoing policy initiatives aimed at industrial upgrading and the green transition. However, the downturn in real estate continued to weigh heavily on property investment and dampened household consumption, doubly driven by a negative wealth effect and reduced demand for housing-related goods and services. Moreover, economic activity has also shown significant volatility, starting the year on a strong note, partly due to the delayed impact of supplementary fiscal measures announced in Q4 2023. However, momentum weakened notably in the second and third quarters as the effects of these policies faded. The combination of slowing growth and renewed concerns over US-China trade tensions prompted policymakers to roll out a more comprehensive package of support measures starting in late September. These measures spanned fiscal, monetary, housing and equity market policies, the aim being to stabilise the economy. The policy-driven initiatives, coupled with a surge in front-loaded exports to preempt potential tariff hikes, helped revive growth momentum toward the end of the year. This rebound ultimately enabled China to meet its 2024 growth target, albeit amid persistent structural challenges.
Looking at 2025, the biggest uncertainty involves the tariff war, which has been compounded by the re-election of Donald Trump and the expected escalation of global protectionist measures. At the time of writing, the Trump administration already implemented two additional 10% tariffs on Chinese goods in early February and March. These measures are particularly damaging for industries heavily reliant on US demand, such as ICT (laptops, mobile phones) and labour-intensive manufactured goods (textiles, clothing, toys, baby carriages). While the immediate impact on exports has been softened by front-loaded demand driven by expectations of even higher tariffs – Trump threatened a 60% tariff hike on Chinese goods during the election campaign – the full effects are likely to emerge in the second half of 2025. This could include a payback effect, as demand for durable goods is pulled forward, potentially leading to a slowdown later in the year. In response, China has imposed retaliatory tariffs of 10-15% on selected goods imported from the US, primarily targeting energy and agrifood products, which account for only a quarter of Chinese imports from America. China’s measured retaliation suggests it is potentially open to further negotiations, although the limited progress in fulfilling the Phase One trade deal signed in early 2020 could complicate discussions moving forward.
In this regard, policy stimulus will be crucial, particularly in offsetting the anticipated slowdown in external demand. Correspondingly, growth drivers are likely to shift in 2025, moving away from exports and toward domestic stimulus. The 2025 fiscal budget is modestly stronger compared to previous years. The official fiscal deficit has been lifted to 4% of GDP, up from the typical 3%, while the issuance of special government bonds – RMB 1.8 trillion for the central government and RMB 4.4 trillion for local governments – has reached a record high. The proceeds are expected to be channeled into investment and consumption. With stimulus focused on consumer goods trade-in programmes and large-scale strategic construction projects, durable goods consumption and manufacturing investments are likely to emerge as the key beneficiaries. In particular, the size of fiscal support for consumer goods trade-ins has doubled to RMB 300 billion, up from RMB 150 billion last year, and now extends beyond automobiles and household appliances to include personal electronics.
Renewed focus on resolving local government debt burden
Significant pressure continues to bear on the fiscal situation of local governments in China, primarily due to the sharp decline in non-budgetary financing sources, particularly land sales and borrowing through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). Meanwhile, the issuance of "hidden debt" – off-budget borrowing by local governments – has been a recurring concern for Chinese policymakers, as this hidden debt could exceed half of China’s annual GDP, according to IMF estimates.
To address the growing local government debt burden, China introduced a multi-year debt swap programme in November 2024. The programme, totaling RMB 10 trillion (approximately 7.5% of 2024 GDP), will be implemented over five years. It includes two key components: an increase of RMB 6 trillion in the local government debt ceiling, allocated over three years, to facilitate the swap of hidden debt, and an annual allocation of RMB 800 billion from the special local government bond quota for five years, totalling RMB 4 trillion, also dedicated to hidden debt swaps. While the programme does not involve additional government borrowing, it is expected to save local governments approximately RMB 600 billion in interest payments over the next five years. Moreover, the debt swap will mitigate repayment risks by converting high-risk off-balance-sheet debt into less risky on-balance-sheet government debt, which can theoretically be rolled over indefinitely. In the short term, the easing of cash flow pressures will provide local governments with greater fiscal flexibility. This will enable them to address overdue payments to suppliers and civil servants, as well as fulfill their spending obligations to support economic growth.
China’s current account surplus rebounded in 2024, primarily supported by an improving goods trade balance. This improvement was driven by recovering global demand for electronics, front-loaded demand to preempt potential tariff hikes and weak import demand. However, the services trade deficit widened, largely due to a faster recovery in tourism outflows compared to inflows. This trend was fuelled by China’s expanded visa-free “circle of friends,” which includes popular nearby destinations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, all of which exempted visa requirements for Chinese tourists and came into effect in late 2023 or early 2024. Despite the rebound, the improvement in current account surplus may not be sustainable in 2025 as export growth is expected to slow. On the capital account side, China faced ongoing challenges in 2024. Balance of payments data revealed net foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows throughout the year. These outflows were driven by two key factors: first, foreign firms chose to repatriate their profits amid “de-risking” efforts and seek more attractive interest rates abroad, and second, rising outgoing FDI as Chinese corporates increasingly “go global” to tap new markets and relocate excess production capacity abroad. These dynamics have exerted deprecation pressure on the yuan and have limited the central bank’s ability to implement large scale policy rates cuts, leaving fiscal measures as the primary tool for economic stimulus.
Geopolitical tensions and economic decoupling
While the outcome of the US presidential election may not fundamentally alter the trajectory of US-China strategic competition, the return of Donald Trump to the White House could reshape the dynamics of this rivalry in more unpredictable and potentially disruptive ways. For instance, Trump may revive or escalate trade tariffs, technology sanctions and other economic measures to target China. During his election campaign, he threatened to revoke China’s most-favoured-nation status and impose tariffs of up to 60% on all Chinese imports, and also phase out imports of "essential goods" such as electronics, steel, and pharmaceuticals. In April 2025, the escalation of tariffs between the two powers seemed irresistible.
In this context, the relocation of supply chains away from China could accelerate, as businesses seek to mitigate risks from heightened trade barriers and geopolitical uncertainty. However, the "China+1" strategy may be the object of tighter scrutiny under the second Trump administration, as evidenced by the punitive tariffs already imposed on Chinese solar exports manufactured in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Beijing is likely to double down on its efforts to enhance technological self-reliance via initiatives like "Made in China 2025" and the "dual circulation" strategy aiming to reduce China’s dependence on foreign technology and markets. While these efforts could strengthen China’s resilience to external pressures, they may also lead to greater market restrictions as import substitution policies and localisation requirements could limit foreign firms’ access to key industries. Moreover, recent legislative measures – such as the Anti-Espionage Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and National Security Law – could create an opaquer regulatory environment and complicate foreign firms’ ability to conduct due diligence.